Showing posts with label Real Estate Bubble. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Real Estate Bubble. Show all posts

Sunday, 12 May 2013

Burning Down the House

The goal of this post (whose title is again going to titillate music aficionados) is to give our readers a quick overview of the state of roughly 20 real estate markets around the world. We’ll purposefully omit countries where the bubble has already clearly burst (like Spain, Ireland or Cyprus), although in many of them the downside may still be severe. A notable exception is the U.S., where the savvy policies of the bearded monetary shaman have helped bring the housing bubble back from the dead.
Germany's housing market so far hasn't managed to enter bubble territory, although the recent influx of scared money, coupled with the ultra-loose policies of the ECB are beginning to work their voodoo.
We intend to start with a brief Austrian explanation of the origin of bubbles and how come they often manifest in the RE sector and we’ll then move on to the actual description of the various RE markets, for which we’ll use a combination of statistical data, third party research, anecdotal evidence and direct experience (we’ve been to many of the countries mentioned and we’ve also had a stint in the construction business a few years ago). It’s worth noting that we’re currently short via long-dated put options (although a paper we recently read and on which we may comment in a subsequent post has had us reconsidering the wisdom of buying long dated options, rather than continuously roll-over short-dated ones) a few banks such as CBA in Australia, BNP in France, RY, BNS and CM in Canada: they’ve been binging on RE during recent years and we suspect they won’t be cheering once it becomes obvious that the party is over.
As an aside, we still have to understand why exactly perpetually rising real estate prices (in the face of massive oversupply to boot) are held to be such a boon for an economy, as they only bring about more debt and/or a decrease in disposable incomes as they keep on tying up more and more resources.

On the Origin of Bubbles

Unless one believes that bubbles are a “gift” of God or the inevitable result of the evil capitalists’ activities, the first thing one has to ask himself is “How come there are bubbles?” and the second one is “How come they always (or at least very often) seem to appear in certain specific sectors of the economy (like e.g. real estate)?”. The answers to these very important questions lie in the thorough study of the theories formulated and expounded by the Austrian School of Economics and in particular by its two heavyweights Mises and Rothbard. If one does not wish to read roughly 2.500 dense pages of actually very sound and interesting economic thinking, then we can suggest him to at least have a look at this great article on the production structure assembled by the always excellent Pater Tenebrarum, whose blog we highly recommend and on whose work we’ll rely rather extensively during the course of this post. Here, we’ll just give a short, to-the-point answer to the questions above, simplifying and summarizing more complex concepts that inevitably need other venues to be treated exhaustively.
First of all, we need to recognize the fact that the production structure (i.e. the productive chain that starting from raw resources and labour delivers a final consumer product) is made up of different stages: higher order (like e.g. real estate, the capital equipment industry etc.) and lower order ones (like e.g. your grocer around the corner). These stages are defined according to their distance from the final consumer goods the production of which is always the ultimate goal of the economy: all factors of production, whether original (land/natural resources and labour) or produced (capital goods) are always employed to produce a final consumer good somewhere down the road (i.e. a trashing machine being built today with the use of raw resources and manual or mechanical labour will one day harvest grains that will then be consumed as food). It is important to note that there exists a lag between the beginning of the production process at the highest order and the actual production of the final consumer good (i.e. you can’t produce an iPhone if you haven’t designed it or built the necessary tools and machinery needed to assemble it). The longer the production structure, the longer the lag. It obviously follows from this fact that all investments in the production structure need to be funded by real resources that have already been both produced and saved (since the additional consumer products that will be produced as a result of these investments won’t be available before a certain lag); also, the financing of higher order stages of production requires significantly more resources than the financing of lower order ones, due to the fact that it takes longer for them to yield a final consumer good with which to repay the investment. In the trashing machine example above, we already need to have the grains with which to feed the labourers employed in its construction: we can’t make them work without subsistence whilst waiting for the machine to be completed and the next harvest to begin, no matter how loudly Paul Krugman argues for such an idiotic approach (by the way, we’d love to see him starve whilst trying to prove that you can indeed put the cart before the horse). Money simply facilitates this process: instead of paying our workers with grains, we give them money and they’re free to spend it according to their needs and wants. But the fact remains that we can only fund production with real resources and the appearance of fiat money (via printing and credit expansion) does not magically make appear real resources as well.
That said, how do we go about deciding the allocation of resources between the different stages of production (i.e. how do we decide whether to invest more in harvesting machines or whether to keep harvesting by hand or even whether to further lengthen the structure by investing in the designing of a plant that will produce new and more efficient tools to facilitate our harvesting)? It all depends on our time preference rate, that is it depends on our willingness to sacrifice present consumption (that we need to save to finance investments) in favour of higher, but future consumption. Each one of us of course has his own personal preferences and in a complex market economy where many economic actors interact all these different preferences combine into forming the originary rate of interest (which is nothing but the society-wide time preference rate), in the same way in which buyers and sellers combine in forming the market price for a good. This originary rate of interest is not set in stone, but rather changes as conditions (like e.g. the size of the pool of real funding) and preferences change, again in the same way as prices do. [For the sake of simplicity we omit to mention here the fact that each and every good has its own specific rate of interest and that there exists a never-fulfilled tendency towards the harmonization of all these different rates.] Originary interest combines with a risk premium (dependent on the creditworthiness of the borrower), a price premium (dependent on the expected changes in the purchasing power of money) and an entrepreneurial profit to form the interest rate.
With the above in mind, we can now begin to see how bubbles come into existence and the sectors in which they are likely to occur. The investor who needs to allocate capital (i.e. real, saved resources) relies on the interest rate to facilitate his calculations of which allocations are profitable (by discounting in the present the future value expected to be generated by the various investments). He also uses money as a unit of account and its availability as a proxy for the availability of the real resources this money is supposed to represent. We can now realize that if the money (or credit) is not backed by real resources, if its value is subject to a constant, subtle erosion and if the rate of interest does not truly reflect the real society-wide time preference rate then the investor can very hardly avoid making a mistake in his calculations.
It also becomes clear that the higher stages of production will be affected more by such interferences than the lower stages as the lag between an investment in such stages and the actual production of the final consumer goods is greater and this makes its profitability significantly more dependent from changes in the rate of interest (since the period to be discounted using that rate is longer).
Recalling the fact that investing in higher stages is more resource-consuming, we can see how these false signals that encourage investments in these higher stages in the absence of the required amount of saved-up resources are especially pernicious, as they deprive the economy of significant amounts of real capital that may have been used to satisfy far more pressing needs (as an example think of all the stuff that gets used up and all the people that are employed when building one of the famous “stimulative” bridges to nowhere). Moreover, when it is discovered that the required resources the existence of which was feigned do not actually exist, the re-adjustment process becomes inevitable (i.e. the bubble bursts).
Proof of our assertions can be found in the fact that, as far as we know, we have not once seen or heard of a bubble in greengroceries, with people rushing to open up stores to sell apples and bananas to frenzied consumers (as the grocer buys the groceries wholesale at dawn and sells them throughout the day and does not need any particular capital equipment to carry out his job, he is basically immune from manipulations of the rate of interest, although as readers can see in the article linked in the next paragraph overconsumption takes place during a boom as well and is then inevitably followed by “forced savings” and this inevitably affects the latter stages). On the other hand, we’ve been to many cities with office and residential towers popping up like fungi and where we could see a real estate agency on every corner (or even more often) and meet deluded people who were happy to share their dreams of boundless wealth (of course, they only needed RE prices to go just a little bit higher).
We want to make an additional and apodictic consideration (although we do provide a link here for those who want to further examine the argument): the stage of the production structure most neglected during the boom phase is the middle one.
And with this we end our brief introduction, again stressing the need for way more thorough investigation of the matter on the part of interested readers.

Old Europe

Let’s begin with where we live, the wonderful continent of Europe. Readers interested in knowing more about it, in a heavily stereotyped (and hence fun) way, can watch “Jeremy Clarkson meets the neighbours”: here is the link to episode one!

Netherlands

Here we start with a massive one! It seems to us that the Dutch are suffering from Tulipomania-related nostalgia and as such have been busy blowing a new bubble, and one for the ages!
Household debt to GDP as well as household debt to disposable income ratios of 250% and skyrocketing home prices: an explosive combination! The end result is one of the most overvalued RE markets in the world, that lately clearly appears to be faltering. With 650 billion € of RE loans outstanding, stockholders, bondholders and depositors at Dutch banks beware: you may get Cyprus’d before you know it, as our beloved Reggie often reminds to the Irish!
Interested readers can find more info here, here, here and here.


Dutch housing data
Two Charts depicting the performance of the Dutch housing market in recent years, via Global Property Guide.


household debt
A wee bit of debt currently on the balance sheet of Dutch households, from the previously linked Acting-Man post.

France

Ze French would obviously not tolerate to be left behind by anybody (ah, la grandeur!) and so here we have them, with their RE market right on top of the list of the most overvalued in the world. Depending on the valuation measure used (whether disposable incomes or rents), prices are roughly 35-50% above their long-term average ratios, which means that, according to the law of the pendulum, they are likely to go quite a bit below said average ratios once the bubble pops. We wouldn’t be surprised to see prices at least halve over the course of the coming years, particularly if Monsieur Hollande keeps acting like a lunatic (let’s be honest: he looks like one, doesn’t he?! Have a look here!). It’s interesting to note that in Paris and in the surrounding region overvaluation is even more extreme, likely due in part to the economic and political importance of the area and in part to the huge influx of foreign money (this resembles the situation of London in the U.K., see below). No Pétrus for recent buyers, that’s for sure! A marked slowdown in building activity and a recent decline in sales (which turned into a 44% plunge in the number of transactions in Paris), accompanied by a modest reduction in prices may signal that the party is rapidly ending (readers need to remember here that prices are the last component to deteriorate, with construction activity and more importantly sales acting as early-warning signals). Interested readers can learn more here, here, here, here and here.


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French home prices relative to disposable income, divided per region, chart courtesy of CGEDD.


Belgium

Even the tiny country of Belgium has managed to blow a rather sizable RE bubble, with remarkable levels of overvaluation. Interestingly, the market seems to be giving only feeble signals that the unwinding process may be about to begin: prices continue to creep higher (albeit not in Brussels), with the only warnings being a slowdown in construction activity and a decrease in mortgage issuance. We do however doubt that the Belgian bubble could be able to withstand a popping of neighbouring bubbles (France and Netherlands) and/or a new iteration of the global financial crisis (which, as readers of this blog know, we consider to be baked in the cake). Interested readers please have a look here and here.

 image Belgian house prices: still no sign of collapsing. Chart via Global Property Guide.


U.K.

The U.K. also sports a severely overvalued RE market, with London being one of the most expensive cities in the world when it comes to buying a house. Prices are at least 30% above their historic valuation ratios. Of course, British blokes are up to their eyeballs in debt (in the Greater London area mortgage servicing takes up on average a whopping 35% of income). And quite naturally the government feels compelled to encourage even more reckless borrowing (we want to reassure the author of the linked article, as there’s no risk of creating a new RE bubble: there already is one that is alive an well!). So far no major warning shots have yet been fired by the market (although there has certainly been a slowdown), however we encourage current RE owners not to feel too safe, as the foundations of the bubble are clearly shaky ones and a new recession or a financial shock may very well prove to be the proverbial nail in the coffin. Other, more detailed information can be found here and here.

 
The dizzying chart of U.K. real estate prices, via Global Property Guide.

Switzerland

Even the famously dull Swiss have not resisted the temptation of engaging in a massive real estate binge, thanks in part to the mental policies of the SNB (zero rates and a money printing bonanza designed to stop the “harmful” rise of the Franc) and the large inflows of scared foreign money in search of a safe haven (and which may have ended up finding a grave). The result is a horrendously overvalued market where interest-only mortgages are common practice (otherwise many chaps could not even begin to think about buying a home) and where many cities and popular resort towns now sport some of the highest prices per square meter of the whole orbis terrarum. And so the secluded alpine country, famous producer of excellent chocolate and cuckoo clocks of dubious taste, is now drowning in debt, to the tune of 175% of disposable income. Again, there are no clear signs that the end may be approaching. In fact, it seems like the bubble is currently accelerating into its final blow-off stage. Readers are invited to read more here, here, here and here.


A chart of RE prices in Switzerland, which conceals the astonishing increases witnessed by some of the major cities.

Sweden

Even the supposedly safe Northern European countries have taken part in the global RE bubble and they’ve done so with much gusto, as we shall see here. Starting with Sweden, we want to mention that prices have now begun to decline moderately, after having experienced an incredible run-up (more than doubling in the last decade). However RE is still severely unaffordable and at the very least 20% above its long-term average valuations. A household debt-to-income ratio of roughly 175% completes the picture. Signs of a slowdown are now present, but not yet obvious. For more on the topic please click here, here, here, here and here.


Housing prices in Sweden: now beginning to decline after coming close to a triple in less than two decades.


Norway

Norway is not in much better shape than Sweden. Arguably, the situation there may even be worse, due to the fact that its bubble has grown significantly larger than Sweden’s. Proof can be found in the fact that households now sport a debt-to-income ratio grater than 200%, not to mention that RE prices may be as much as 70% above their long-term averages, depending on the valuation metric used. Socialist paradise anyone?! Particularly worrying is that fact that so far there have been few if any signs of More facts can be dug up here, here, here, here and here.

Honestly, we can’t see a bubble here, can you?! A mere tripling in 15 years can’t count as one! Via Global Property Guide.

Denmark

Apparently even the almost inconsequential country of Denmark has managed to blow its own RE bubble and to make sure it was noticed abroad it made it egregious. Maybe exponentially-rising home prices have helped the Danes cheer up a bit, but don’t hold your breath for it. In any case, the solution to the supply-demand imbalance appears simple to us: just build a few Lego houses! Household debt is more than 300% (yes, that’s not a typo) of disposable income and house prices have almost tripled in the last 15 years. Also of note is the sheer size of the nation’s mortgage market: 600 billion € ready to blow up in the face of not very smart holders. The bubble here has clearly burst and the real fun is just beginning, as both the government and the banks scramble to find a way to keep the ponzi scheme going. More info here, here, here, here and here.


The party has clearly ended in Denmark: now it’s a question of who’s going to eat the losses. Chart via Global Property Guide.

Finland

We terminate our overview of European RE markets with Finland, which also has its home-made bubble, although maybe less egregious than those of its neighbouring countries. Debt-to-income is “only” a bit above 100%, but home prices have almost tripled in the last 15 years. As of late the bubble seems to be wobbling, with price appreciation having slowed down markedly. Readers can continue their research here, here and here.


House prices in Finland, via Global Property Guide.

Down Under

We now move to the Southern Hemisphere.

Oz

Australia is where one of the most egregious RE bubble in the world has popped up, thanks in part to the commodities boom and to an enormous credit expansion. Houses are now at the very least 30% overvalued (with 40% to 50% being a more credible estimate), with cities such a Sidney sporting some truly ridiculous prices. Household debt stands at 150% of disposable income and most of it is mortgage debt, which the fractionally-reserved banks have very generously offered to the usual muppets who could ill-afford it. No problem though: skies are clear and prices keep on rising like there’s no tomorrow! Actually, they don’t: prices have stalled and have now begun to decline, although at a moderate pace. Their decrease is accompanied by a sharp decline in the number of sales and a marked slowdown in construction activity: it seems to us that the unwinding has begun, particularly given that China is now beginning to crumble as well (more on the topic below). Plenty of links for the passionate investigators: here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here (where the author shares his delusion that prices cannot possibly collapse since, among other things, they may have “plateaued”: 1929 anybody?!).


Prices in Australia have now begun their long trip down, via Global Property Guide.


Debt as a percentage of annual disposable income
Debt to disposable income ratio for Australian households: pretty high and most of it is mortgage debt. Chart from one of the articles linked above.


New Zealand

Apparently, the Aussie’s neighbours aren’t doing much better. In fact, it seems they’re currently experiencing the final stage of the bubble, with relatively brisk price increases across the board and some signs of a looming slowdown. Of course, the debt to income ratio stands at a quite buoyant 150% and prices are at least 25% overvalued, but may be as much as 65% more expensive that their long term average. Our guess is that when the Australian housing market finally sneezes the NZ is going to catch a cold. More information can be found here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here (again, delusional – or maybe self-serving - comments about the non-existence of the bubble).


NZ house prices, via Global Property Guide. And they have the audacity to claim that there’s no bubble?!


Here we have the usual wee bit of debt. Via one of the previously-linked articles.



South Africa

We have decided to include South Africa simply because we had the chance to visit it right at the height of its massive RE bubble and we enjoyed looking at then-current listings (referring to them as totally ridiculous is a huge understatement) and chat with a few chaps there about the market and we returned home deeply satisfied, with the persuasion that the market was headed for a decade or more of Buddhist-like nothingness. And in fact it seems like we were spot on, as prices have gone pretty much nowhere during the last few years, notwithstanding a relatively significant depreciation of the currency. But now it seems like the globalized inflationary race has begun to work its wonder on SA as well, with prices again starting to increase at a quite rapid pace. Whether this is just a temporary phenomenon or the beginning of a new bubble still remains to be seen. In any case, as much as SA is a lovely country, we wouldn’t buy a home there. Debt to disposable income stands at 76%, but remember that a large part of the population cannot possibly think about borrowing as they’re too busy surviving. Further info can be accessed here, here, here, here and here.

                                                             
House prices in SA and YoY % change in nominal and real terms, via Global Property Guide.

North America

We’ll now quickly review the state of the housing market in the U.S. and Canada. It’s worth mentioning that Bernanke is “successfully” (depending on how you define success) re-inflating the once-burst U.S. housing bubble. Of course this is bound to generate even deeper distortions and dislocations in the economy’s structure of production. It won’t end merrily.

U.S.

The witch doctor, alternatively known as Fed Chairman, Ben S. has managed to re-start many bubble activities that were justly interrupted in the wake of the 2008 collapse. Of course this has happened at a grave cost, as unsustainable and ultimately unprofitable capital-consuming activities continue to be allowed to take place, at the expense of everyone in the economy. Housing is of course chief amongst these bubble activities and the market has experienced a strong rebound. Whether it’s going to survive the coming crisis is of course highly questionable. In the meantime, ever more people are getting sucked in, ready to be spit out in pieces once the downturn arrives (and it always arrives, although it often takes longer than anticipated). It should be clear that this whole process does nothing but inherently weaken an economy. Anyway, let’s review some data: debt to disposable income stands at 115% (whereas household debt to GDP currently is close to 90%), home prices are increasing at the fastest pace since 2006 (which was pure bubble territory) and median nominal prices for new homes are again at levels close to those registered at the last bubble’s peak. You draw your own conclusions! Here, here, here, here, here, here and here readers can find more information. Moreover we recommend this blog and all the articles published at Acting Man by guest author Ramsey Su.


U.S. home prices have begun to creep up again: a new bubble is forming? Via Global Property Guide.


Trailing Twelve Month Average of Median U.S. New Home Sale Prices, January 1963 - January 2013
Median U.S. new home prices: back in bubble territory. Chart taken from this article.


Canada

Here we have another contestant for the top prize in the category “Most overvalued RE market in the world”! Again, the culprit is the reckless monetary policy of the central bank, which has allowed bank credit (i.e. credit that is not backed by real resources) to boom. The global commodities boom has also helped in fuelling the bubble. The result is that now Canadian households have a debt to income ratio above 160% and home prices are at least 35% overvalued (but the figure may very well be significantly higher, maybe even in the vicinity of 80%). Warnings signs have begun to appear as of late, with construction activity slowing down, sales number continuing to significantly deteriorate and a series of six uninterrupted monthly price declines. More information can be found here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and finally here (look at his bright face and then ponder whether his “well-reasoned” arguments hold any value).

Canadian home prices via Global Property Guide: up, up and away!


Rest of the World

Let’s now quickly review the state of the housing market in a few more countries, before drawing our conclusions. We wan to to briefly mention that both Dubai and Hong Kong, by keeping their currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar, basically adopt the Fed’s monetary policy. As a result, their RE bubbles are sort of echo bubble, magnified by the relatively small size of their economies and by the huge foreign capital influxes. On the other hand, both Singapore and Hong Kong sport very low taxes and a remarkable level of economic freedom and are thus engaged in true wealth generating activities, which to a marginal extent mitigate the impact of the bubble.

Dubai

We couldn’t avoid mentioning Dubai, as it’s arguably the most absurd place on the earth, a big playground for His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, a child at heart with gobs of money at his disposal. "The word 'impossible' is not in leaders' dictionaries. No matter how big the challenges, strong faith, determination and resolve will overcome them.". Sure, we mere mortals can’t argue with such words of wisdom, but in the meantime we humbly suggest to include the world “bubble” in the aforementioned dictionary (“debt restructuring” is already in it). Oh, and we happen to have a nice bridge to sell, should His Highness be interested!
We were in the city of dreams (which may become nightmares) recently and we were delighted to see cranes all over the place: 2008 hasn’t taught the morons a thing! In fact evidence seems to suggest that there currently is a new speculative mania underway in Dubai’s property market. Proof of the foolishness of such RE frenzy lies in the sheer number of empty units. Again, we seriously doubt it could survive a resurgence of the 2008 financial crisis. The only mitigating circumstances are the absence of taxes and the relative degree of economic freedom, which, in an increasingly more totalitarian world, appear as ever more valuable features. More info here, here, here, here, here and here for a bit of colour!

Singapore

Singapore is another very overvalued RE market (with the only caveat mentioned above), with prices roughly 50% above their long-term average according to The Economist. Signs of a slowdown are present, although we haven’t still heard a clear popping sound. Interested readers can have a look here, here, here, here and here.


                                               



                                           



House prices in Singapore and their YoY % change, via Global Property Guide.


Hong Kong and China

Hong Kong is probably the single most overvalued RE market in the world, with Canada the only true contestant for the top spot. Prices there have tripled in less than a decade and are now roughly 70% overvalued. We explained the dynamics of the bubble above. We just want to add that the market is now in a manic blow-off stage, with prices increasing more than 20% in the last year. If we had a house there we would be rushing to sell it, not now but yesterday! Further information can be found here, here, here and here.



                                           
                                                 

Hong Kong RE prices and their YoY % change: a sheer bubble is glaringly obvious. Charts from Global Property Guide.


China is a bit of a different story, quite complex and murky. We won’t analyze the market in detail here (although we do not rule out doing it in a future post): we’ll just provide some basic info and a quick overview. Real estate speculation is the national sport there and it’s also the main tool the all-knowing wild bunch of bureaucrats ruling the country uses to achieve the desired level of “growth” (i.e. an orgy of malinvestments mistaken for a mirage of prosperity). Leverage is also present in spades, notwithstanding the usually benign official statistics, thanks mainly to the so-called “shadow banking system” (i.e. a colourful potpourri of moneylenders, pawnbrokers and loan sharks). The picture is completed by the by-now famous “ghost cities”, imposing monuments to the utter madness of which humans are capable. Signs of a slowdown are present, but not yet unequivocal. It is however important to note that our Mandarin friends do not stand out for their transparency. Interested readers are welcomed to learn more here, here, here, here, here and here.


Property prices in China have experienced a “healty” increase in the last decade, via Global Property Guide.


An interesting documentary on China’s ghost cities.


Conclusion

It should be clear by now that the world at large is in the midst of an egregious real estate bubble (actually bubbles are pretty much everywhere and not only in RE, hence Jesse Colombo’s apt definition of this epoch as The Bubble Bubble, a bubble of bubbles). We have of course not covered all the countries in the world, but readers should have developed a taste for what it’s like. Those who are willing to spend some time doing further investigations can take a look at India or other emerging markets and see whether they can see any differences with the countries presented above. The takeaway is clear in our opinion: wherever you are, think twice before buying a house! Interesting speculative opportunities also abound, as shorting the stocks of banks that are heavily exposed to bubbly RE markets is likely to prove profitable, provided it’s done in an intelligent way. Exercising patience is always necessary though, as many of these bubbles could keep on going for quite some time, especially given the reckless policies currently implemented by global central banks (and we have them and their fractionally-reserved cronies to thank for this mess). Warning signs abound in many cases, but timing is always the tricky part. And of course there’s no substitute for doing your homework.
As a final note, we’re generally not prone to self-praise, but assembling this post has really been yeoman’s work and we hope that our readers will appreciate it and if so help spread it to a wider audience.

Monday, 21 January 2013

The Yen: a Contrarian’s Wet Dream


The objective of this post is to clearly delineate the reasons behind our recent Yen bullishness and to explain why we think buying it against the Australian and New Zealand dollars is likely to prove a very profitable and relatively safe speculation. We need however to immediately point out that everything we are going to write below is conditional upon the Bank of Japan continuing to do what it has always done (and what we think is likely to continue to do), namely to say one thing and then do another (or slowly do just a little of that one thing). In case the demented Abe is capable of fully enforcing his delirious inflationary views on the BoJ, then dear readers brace yourselves and prepare for the Misesian “disastrous bull market”… This is the main reason why we advocate implementing the trade with a judicious use of call options on the Yen (or put options on the Aussie and Kiwi), as they both buy us time and protect us from unwanted catastrophic scenarios that, although unlikely, could nonetheless materialize. With the above in mind, let’s begin our analysis.

The Fundamental Backdrop

A) Japan’s Money Supply growth is both modest and lower than that of other major currency blocks

Leaving aside temporary phenomena which might impact it, the long-term value of a currency is mainly determined by its supply and demand dynamics: in the end it will tend towards the level where demand and supply converge. So the main question an investor has to ask himself is: what is the current supply/demand status quo and how it is likely to be impacted by future developments?
We won’t cover here all the factors influencing the demand side, apart from briefly mentioning that during periods of economic turmoil society’s reservation demand for money (see Rothbard, “Man, Economy and State with Power and Markets” - Chap. 11) tends to sharply increase (as a reflection of the increased uncertainty market participants face). Of course such demand will tend to focus on those forms of money which, correctly or not, market participants perceive to be of highest quality. This is the formal explanation behind the safe haven trade and the reason why during the last crisis the Yen and the Dollar benefited handsomely at the expense of other, less trusted, currencies like the Euro. We will instead focus on the supply side.

TMSComparison
Japan’s True Austrian Money Supply as calculated by Michael Pollaro at The Contrarian Take.

As can be seen in the chart above, sourced from the highly recommended blog of Michael Pollaro, Japan’s True Austrian Money Supply growth has been muted in recent years (readers interested in learning what this money supply measure contains and why, as well as in which respect it differs from commonly used metrics like M1 and M2, can do so here and here). Even more importantly, given that currencies do not trade in a vacuum but rather against each other, it has been consistently lower than those of other important currency blocks like the U.S., the Euro area and the U.K (not shown in the chart above and yet important to mention is the fact that BoJ’s credit has only recently reached its old 2005 peak, whilst other central banks have tripled, quadrupled or even quintupled their credit since the beginning of the financial crisis).
There are two main reasons as to why this has been (and may well continue to be) the case: on the one hand, the BoJ has been reluctant in injecting large doses of newly created money into the economy, notwithstanding all their posturing; on the other hand Japanese banks have been more than happy to grab the chance to engage in massive deleveraging (a.k.a. credit contraction), thus counterbalancing to a large extent the effect of money printing (it should be noted here that inflation is correctly defined as an increase in the supply of money and money substitutes). Going forward, the second factor is likely to remain unaltered, given that the sorry state of the Japanese economy and the increasing likelihood of a globalized slowdown mean that banks are probably going to be unwilling to extend new credit (please see chart below). So the question becomes whether the BoJ will truly print enough to overcome the deflationary effect of credit contraction and to outdo its competitors in the mindless race to devalue (on this last point please see our paragraph below). We are inclined to think that much of what we’ve heard so far is little more than political manoeuvring and that in the end they won’t seriously alter the status quo lest they may finally wreck the ship, given that Japan’s precarious position does not allow much if any room for “funny money” experiments. The BoJ’s meeting this week will give us some clues as to the likely direction they’ll take, although the actual implementation of their programs is what matters most.

japan-loans-to-private-sector
A chart showing first the decline and then the almost non-existent growth of credit in Japan, via http://www.tradingeconomics.com/.

We recommend our readers to have a look at all of Michael Pollaro’s charts on Japan’s True Austrian Money Supply as well as his work on other currency blocks. We also suggest reading this WSJ article, in which the author points out that Abe’s inflationist policies might upset some powerful sectors of the business establishment (not to mention many other innocent people as well as the poor chaps at the bottom of the economic ladder, who always suffer the most from such insanity). Incidentally, this has so far been the only mainstream article we have been able to find which didn’t contain gloomy predictions about the Yen’s imminent demise and which didn’t simply regurgitate some expert’s opinion about why shorting the Yen is going to be the greatest thing since sliced bread…

B) Other Countries are unlikely to let themselves be outprinted by the BoJ

We have already mentioned the fact that so far the BoJ has shown remarkable temperance in its money printing (and that other central banks have not), but should they decidedly change course, what are other countries going to do? Are they going to let themselves be “outprinted” by these latecomers in the inflation game? On this topic we can do no better than pointing our readers to this excellent article written by the always excellent Pater Tenebrarum, which closely mirrors our own views and even includes a nice haiku for the discerning reader. It appears clear to us that the fallacious and highly damaging mercantilist approach is going to be embraced (or has already been embraced) by most nations, thus making any devaluation attempt on the part of the BoJ unlikely to succeed (particularly if half-hearted).

C) The influence of Capital Repatriation (i.e. carry trade and Japanese overseas investments)

This point analyses in more detail one of those temporary phenomena which might impact the value of a currency: the sudden shift of large amounts of capital from one currency block to another. As we have already witnessed during 2008, when a serious, unexpected crisis strikes, massive quantities of money, which previously headed, during the course of many months or even years, in a certain way, are quickly moved back in the opposite direction, thus causing extremely powerful trends in the currency cross involved. This can be likened to the effect that suddenly opening the floodgates of a large dam has on the underlying brook.
In the case of the Japanese Yen, we think there are at least two factors which might contribute to this phenomenon materializing: the infamous carry trade and the repatriation of foreign holdings on the part of Japanese investors.
The former is certainly no longer as large as it once used to be, both because many speculators got badly burned during its 2008 dramatic unwind and because the spread amongst yields has been steadily diminishing. However, the fact that the hunt for yield has become even more desperate and the stable if mild uptrend which many risk currencies (like the AUD or the NZD) enjoyed against the Yen since the post-crisis rebound of 2009 might have induced at least a modest resurgence of this phenomenon. A generally low level of forex volatility that reached its apex during last summer probably also played an encouraging role. It’s important to note that this is only speculation on our part, as we do not have any concrete evidence to back our claims.
The latter factor, on the other hand, has in our opinion the potential to generate the kind of outsized forex move we’re looking forward to. Japanese investors hold a staggering $3.3 trillion of foreign assets, which amounts to roughly 55% of their annual GDP. The Ministry of Finance holds approximately $1.27 trillion in exchange reserves, whilst the remaining $2 trillion are held by the private sector. During a crisis, either out of fear or out of necessity, some of these holdings are liquidated and the proceeds repatriated: this has an obvious boosting effect on the Yen. This is exactly what happened during the spring/summer of 2011: both the massive earthquake that shattered Japan in March and the mini bear market that shook global markets during the summer induced capital flight and thus generated a quite powerful rally in the Yen, which took place notwithstanding a globalized manipulative effort to the contrary on the part of the G-7 (which was capable only of producing a temporary spike in late March of 2011). We expect this to happen again, only on a much larger scale, during the coming bear market.
As to why we chose Australia and New Zealand as the main counterparties to our long Yen campaign (apart from the specific reasons outlined in the paragraph below), please consider the following: roughly 80% of Australian government bonds and 70% of Australian corporate bonds are owned by foreign investors (sources here and here); the situation in New Zealand in not much different, with 62% of government securities now held by foreigners. We suspect this is going to have a huge negative impact on their currencies in case of a global crisis. The icing on the cake is that Japan’s investments in Australia total more than $123 billion and account for 6% of all foreign investments in the country (placing Japan firmly in the third place, behind the U.S. and the U.K.). Almost half of this sum is invested in Aussie bonds, in a desperate hunt for yield. There are signs that this phenomenon is accompanied by dangerously high levels of complacency and euphoria ("If you think there's been a lot of investment from Japan in Australia so far, just you wait and see," Mr Beazley said. "The Australian economy looks and feels extremely secure."). Finally, the traditionally risk-averse Japanese individual investors have recently started to become excited about the U.S. and other foreign equity markets, exactly at a time when caution would be advised.

D) A Brief Introduction to the Australian Bubble

We will now briefly cover the main reasons which stand behind our calling Australia a bubble.

1. Brisk monetary growth, both in absolute terms and when compared to other countries:

M1Index
The hallmark of all bubbles: monetary growth. M1 in Australia, the U.S. and Japan, indexed at 100 in January 2005.

M1Comparison
A long-term chart showing the annual percentage changes in M1 for the same three countries. Australia has often led the way.

It appears clear from the charts above that there has been remarkable inflation going on in Australia for at least two full decades and we know that with inflation malinvestments and capital consumption inevitably occur. Japan on the other hand has certainly been the least bad of the group, something which we already remarked above [Ed. Note: since we do not have True Money Supply statistics for Australia, we are using M1, which acts as a decent proxy.].

2. Large amounts of debt, mainly concentrated in the household sector:

HouseholdDebt
Household debt as a percentage of GDP: higher than in the U.S.

Australian households are buried in debt: if the economy barely sneezes, they’ll get pneumonia. In this context, it’s worth nothing that the latest PMI reading (December 2012) came in at 44.3, marking the 10th consecutive month of contraction, and that the overall picture painted by the report is rather bleak: interested readers can find more info here.

3. The always-present real estate bubble:

Global house prices_ Clicks and mortar _ The Economist
House prices in Australia, U.K., Canada, Spain, Japan and the U.S. via The Economist.

HousingGlobalPropertyGuide
Year over Year % change in real estate prices in Australia, via Global Property Guide.

It’s quite obvious that there’s a massive property bubble in Australia. Other indicators looking at affordability (namely price to income and price to rent ratios) also signal massive overvaluation. Mortgages account for a large part of the astronomically high household debt [Ed. Note: readers can find some interesting info here. We also think that the whole blog is worth keeping an eye on.]. When will this bubble pop, as they all inevitably do? We wouldn’t rule out it’s already in the process of deflating, given that we’ve had two years in a row of declining prices (recall how in the U.S. prices topped in 2005, roughly two to three years prior to the actual bust) accompanied by declining sales in both the residential [Ed. Note: forget the mindless babbling of the article’s author and instead just focus on the chart at the top of the page.] and commercial sectors. Moreover, point 4 below might prove to be the prick that this floating balloon needs so badly.

4. Australia’s fate is highly dependent on China:

Exports to China constitute roughly 29% of all Australian exports, with Iron Ore accounting for more than half of the total, with Coal, Gold and Oil distant followers (all data sourced here). It’s not difficult to envision what would happened in case the much-talked-about Chinese hard landing materialized. As a side note, we’re highly sceptical of the Chinese boom as well, given that it’s built on the shaky foundations of money and credit inflation, coupled with massive state intervention in the economy (which all result in malinvestments and capital consumption). Curious readers could embark on their own research on the topic: we’ll just mention that ghost cities are amongst our favourite manifestations of the massive misallocations and imbalances currently plaguing China, mercantilist extraordinaire.

Technicals, Sentiment and Positioning

From a technical perspective, the Yen is severely oversold and incredibly stretched below its long-term moving averages (like e.g. the 200-day simple moving average):

yen
A chart showing the Japanese Yen Index, via http://stockcharts.com/.

It’s important to note that the index above tracks the movements of the Yen against a basket of currencies and that the levels reached against certain currencies (like e.g. the Euro, the AUD, the MXN and the NZD) are even more extreme.

JY
Yapanese Yen Futures Positioning, via http://www.cotpricecharts.com/.

Positioning in the futures market is also remarkably elevated, with small speculators holding a record amount of shorts and large speculators’ shorts at a multi-year high (significantly higher levels were recorded during the summer of 2007, right at the peak of an egregious bubble and at a time when the carry trade was still buoyant). It’s worth mentioning that this is accompanied by opposite extremes in AUD and MXN positioning, thus showing a propensity toward risk-taking and generalized complacency. We briefly mention here that record CoT readings in risk-on and risk-off currencies usually provide very reliable contrary signals on the stock market as well.
Finally, sentiment on the Yen lies at multi-year (possibly all-time) lows, with Sentimentrader’s Public Opinion Survey showing only 16.5% of bulls, after having spent quite some time in the below-neutrality zone. Moreover, the Yen is universally hated: we have yet to see somebody who is not bearish on it. Pundits and talking-heads as well as many self-appointed experts have all been quick to point out how the currency is doomed, how shorting it is going to be the best trade of 2013 (when in fact it most likely was one of the best trades of 2012...), how the BoJ will inflate ad infinitum etc. As the heading of one of our favourite blogs reads: "When it's obvious to the public, it's obviously wrong."
The conclusion is clear: rarely have we seen such extremes and they have never proved to be the hallmark of a sustainable trend.
Moreover, an investor has always to ask himself: what is the market already discounting? It appears to us that in this specific case the market has already priced in many negative developments, some real some most likely not, leaving ample space for positive surprises.

Conclusion

We are very bullish on the Yen and we are convinced that the best way to position ourselves is to buy it against fundamentally weak currencies like the Aussie Dollar. The important caveat is that the mental Abe could really wreak havoc on the country and consequently on its currency, given that Japan truly is just a little inflation away from total disaster. We always prompt our readers to engage in their own research. In our next post, we’ll discuss how secular bull markets generally end and which common traits they tend to share at such a juncture: as you’ll see, the Yen currently displays none of them.

Addendum

The BoJ set a 2% inflation target and embraced open-ended asset purchases: we have to confess that we are rather pleased to see this outcome, given that on the one hand it deprives the hallucinated Abe of the possibility to attack the Bank and on the other it gives the Bank itself the flexibility to decide how much and when to print (whereas a fixed monetary goal would have forced them to act and would have always elicited calls to "do more"). Moreover, there wouldn't be any additional money printing until 2014. We'll now have to watch like hawks how this new program is implemented (and whether the appointment of the new BoJ governor in April will change the landscape significantly), as this is what really matters: should the BoJ really print ad infinitum, then it would be game over; should they decide to continue to deliver only a modicum of money printing now and then, as they've always done, then the secular Yen bull market should resume its advance. So far the market's reaction gives us cause for optimism: at least a short to medium term rebound is likely in the cards, as too many jumped too quickly on the short yen boat.